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A Multiple Country Test of an Oath Script 
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Hypothetical bias is one of the main issues bedeviling the field of nonmarket valuation. The 
general criticism is that survey responses reflect how people would like to behave, rather than how 
they actually behave. In our study of climate change and emissions reductions, we took advantage of 
the increasing bulk of evidence from psychology and economics that addresses the effects of making 
promises, in order to investigate the effect of an oath script in a contingent valuation survey. The 
survey was conducted in Sweden and China, and its results indicate that an oath script has significant 
effects on respondent behavior in answering willingness-to-pay (WTP) questions, some of which vary 
by country. In both countries, the share of zero WTP responses and extremely high WTP responses 
decreases when an oath script is used, which also results in lower variance. In China, the oath script 
also reduces the average WTP, cutting it by half in certain instances. We also found that the oath 
script has different impacts on various respondent groups. For example, without the oath script, 
Communist party members in China are more likely than others to have a positive WTP for emissions 
reductions, but with the oath script, there is no longer any difference between the groups. 
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The Truth, the Whole Truth, and Nothing but the Truth 
A Multiple Country Test of an Oath Script 
 
Fredrik Carlsson, Mitesh Kataria, Alan Krupnick, Elina Lampi, 




Stated preference methods are frequently used for valuing public and quasi-public 
goods. Indeed, for some types of public goods, such as those with expected high existence 
values, only stated preference approaches are available. One of the major concerns with 
stated preference approaches is to what extent survey responses are consistent with actual 
decision-making behavior, often called hypothetical bias.
1
In the contingent valuation literature, many studies have explored different methods 
for reducing the difference between real and hypothetical situations. One of the most 
successful and frequently imitated efforts has been the use of a cheap talk script, initially 
suggested by Cummings and Taylor (1999). The cheap talk script aims to reduce hypothetical 
bias by thoroughly describing and discussing the propensity that  respondents  have to 
exaggerate their stated willingness to pay. The underlying idea of the script is that, by raising 
the issue in the survey, respondents would not want to be part of such an ill-behaved group 
and would be less prone to hypothetical bias. The effect of the cheap talk script is varied and, 
among other factors, its success seems to depend on the characteristics of the good, the length 
of the script, and the valuation method (see Aadland and Caplan 2003, 2006; Carlsson et al., 
2005; Cummings and Taylor, 1999; List, 2001; and  Murphy et al., 2005). Given these 
limitations, it is too optimistic to expect cheap talk to completely mitigate hypothetical bias.
 While the empirical evidence is 
not conclusive, the majority of studies suggests that willingness-to-pay (WTP) estimates are 
higher in a hypothetical setting than the corresponding real setting (see for example 
Cummings et al. (1995), Cummings et al. (1997), and Frykblom (1997); see List and Gallet 
(2001) and Murphy et al. (2005) for meta-analyses. Additionally, Ehmke et al. (2008) find 
that the extent of hypothetical bias, for the same survey design, can differ across countries.)  
2
                                                           
1 The term hypothetical bias is somewhat misleading because it suggests that one single real value exists with 
which we can compare the value obtained from a hypothetical situation. However, studies have shown that 
experimental situations involving real payoffs can also lead to biased estimates (e.g., Alpízar et al. 2008; List et 
al. 2004).  
 
2 There are other suggestions for how to reduce hypothetical bias, for example, ex-post calibration of the WTP 
responses with follow-up questions on certainty (e.g., Champ et al. 1997; Champ and Bishop 2001) and time-to-
think protocols (Cook et al. 2007; Whittington et al. 1992). 
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Furthermore, respondents may still be tempted to answer insincerely due to motives, such as 
projecting a “better” self-image, applying strategic behavior, or protesting against the survey.  
A more recent approach to addressing hypothetical bias is the use of an oath script. 
Under this approach, respondents are asked to swear (or promise) to answer truthfully, as if 
they were in a courtroom. An oath can be viewed as an active commitment, in contrast to a 
cheap talk script, which is only informative. Whereas a cheap talk script is likened to using 
“moral suasion,” encouraging the respondents to behave better than others, an oath may 
induce more truthful answers by binding respondents to their answers.  
The seminal paper on the effects of oaths is Jacquemet et al. (2009), which used an 
oath in a laboratory setting. Prior to participating in an incentive-compatible second-price 
auction, bidders were asked to sign an oath document and swear “on their honor” to give 
honest answers. The main result was that subjects who took the oath were, on average, less 
likely to either overstate or understate their bids; that is, the variance of bids was reduced. 
Furthermore, the study found that the hypothetical treatment with an oath outperformed both 
hypothetical and monetary incentivized treatments without an oath, as well as treatments with 
monetary incentives with an oath.
3
The aim of our study is to investigate the effect of an oath script in a contingent 
valuation survey concerning climate change, conducted outside a laboratory setting and with 
a relatively large sample size.
 Jacquemet et al. (2010) found, by comparing votes in a 
real and hypothetical setting with and without an oath script, that an oath script eliminated 
hypothetical bias in an election referendum. 
4
                                                           
3 Jacquemet et al. (2009) found that monetary incentives weaken the positive impact of taking an oath and 
discuss that as an extrinsic motivation. In other words, money may have a crowding-out effect on an intrinsic 
motivation, such as keeping one´s promises after taking an oath. 
 As far as we know, this has not been done before. Note that 
Jacquemet et al. (2010) does not estimate WTP, but instead look at the share of yes-voters in 
for a referendum with a fixed cost (bid). Outside the laboratory setting, for nonmarket goods, 
it is difficult  to test whether or not the oath script leads to a closer match between 
hypothetical and real WTP, since one cannot generally observe real WTP. This is particularly 
true for our good in question, reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. What we can do, 
however, is investigate the differences in WTP across treatments with and without an oath. 
We also relate our main findings to Jacquemet et al. (2009) to see if we find similar behavior.  
4 What works in lab experiments does not necessary work outside the lab. There are many reasons for this. For 
example, differences in population profile (experiments in economics and psychology often use students as 
subjects) and demand effects (i.e., subjects want to comply with what the experimenter expects from them) are 
two well-known sources of possible divergence between lab and field behavior. Jacquemet et al. (2009) found 
evidence against the demand effect in their study. Furthermore, an auction-based value revelation mechanism 
may trigger different behavior and feelings (for example pleasure of winning) compared to a non-market 
valuation survey.  
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The contingent valuation survey elicited willingness to pay for reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions and is conducted with and without an oath script in China and Sweden. We 
analyze the effect of the oath script on two decisions:  first, whether the respondent is willing 
to pay anything to reduce greenhouse gas emissions; and second, how much the respondent is 
willing to pay. Each respondent answers WTP questions for three different  levels of 
emissions reductions. In addition, we identify which sociodemographic groups of respondents 
are more likely to be affected by the oath script. By using identical surveys in China and 
Sweden, we are also able to test the commitment device in two different cultural contexts.  
We find several notable results. First, respondents in both countries are less likely to 
state a zero WTP in the oath treatment, a result that is in line with the findings by Jacquemet 
et al. (2009). Second, the oath script raises the average conditional WTP in Sweden for one of 
three WTP questions asked. In  the Chinese sample the oath script reduced average 
conditional WTP substantially, in some instances around 50 percent. Third, the oath script 
has varying impacts on respondent groups with different demographic characteristics, and we 
find that the cultural context could be an important factor. Last, we find that, irrespective of 
the effect of the oath on average WTP, the variance of the WTP is reduced. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the survey and the oath script, 
as well as hypotheses on the effect of the oath script. Section 2 gives the characteristics of the 
respondents. Section 3 presents the WTP results and econometric analysis, including an 
analysis of which groups of respondents are more likely to change their behavior due to the 
oath script. Section 4 provides overall conclusions.  
1. Descriptions of the Survey and the Oath Script 
The survey consisted of four sections. The first section elicited general attitudes about 
climate change. In the second section, the survey provided information on the effects of 
climate change, which was summarized from IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change) reports. Respondents were told that a future temperature increase will depend on the 
amount of future global CO2  emissions; specifically, if CO2  emissions are reduced from 
current emissions  levels by 30  percent, 60  percent,  or  85  percent, then the temperature 
increase can be limited to 4°F, 3°F, or 2°F, respectively. If the world instead does not reduce 
emissions, but continues with “business as usual,” the temperature is expected to increase by 
more than 4°F by  2050.  We explained that this would most likely correspond to large 
changes in the global ecosystems and most countries would be negatively affected. An 
information screen (figure 1) summarized the effect of the temperature increases on harvests, 
flooding, storms, and ecosystems by the year 2050  that was  shown to the respondents. 
Subsequently, questions about the respondents’ attitudes on reducing global CO2 emissions 
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were included. For a full description of the survey and the implementation, see Carlsson et al. 
(2010). 
Figure 1.  Global CO2  Emissions  Reduction, Temperature Increases,  and  Their  Effects  as 
Described in the Survey 
Global CO2 emissions 
reduction  85% reduction  60% reduction  30% reduction 
Temperature increase  2°F increase  3°F increase  4°F increase 
Harvest 
Harvests in countries near 
the equator decrease by 
4%–6%. Harvests in 
countries in the northern 
hemisphere increase by 
1%–3%. 
Harvests in countries near 
the equator decrease by 
10%–12%. Harvests in 
countries in the northern 
hemisphere are not 
affected. 
Harvests in countries 
near the equator 
decrease by 14%–
16%. Harvests in the 
northern hemisphere 
decrease by 0%–2%. 
Increased flooding and 
storms  
Small tropical islands and 
lowland countries, such 
as Bangladesh, 
experience increased 
flooding and storms.  
Additional low-lying areas 
in the Americas, Asia, and 
Africa experience 
increased flooding and 
storms. 
Populous cities face 
increased flood risks 
from rivers and ocean 
storms. Existence of 




such as coral reefs and 
the Arctic, are threatened. 
Most coral reefs die. 
Additional sensitive 
ecosystems and species 




and species around 
the world are 
threatened. 
Toward the end of section  2, a cheap-talk script was included. In the oath script 
treatment, the commitment device followed the cheap talk script, asking respondents to 
promise to answer the questions truthfully. (The oath script is described and further discussed 
in  section  1.1). This section  of the questionnaire  concluded with the WTP questions for 
reducing CO2 emissions. 
Information about WTP was obtained by using the payment card method, in which 
respondents choose a number from a matrix that represents their maximum WTP for the 
change presented in the question. The values in the matrix ranged between SEK 0 and SEK 
2,000 in the Swedish survey, and between CNY 0 and CNY 740 in the Chinese survey.
5
Respondents who stated a WTP higher than SEK 2,000 (CNY 740) had the option to 
state their maximum WTP in a following open-ended payment question. Three WTP 
questions were asked. First, the survey asked  for  the WTP for  a 30  percent  emissions 
reduction, compared to doing nothing (no reduction). The second WTP question asked the 
respondents how much more they would pay for a 60 percent reduction instead of the 30 
percent reduction. Finally, the third WTP question asked the respondents how much more 
they would pay for an 85 percent reduction instead of the 60 percent reduction.  
  
                                                           
5 SEK = Swedish kronor; CNY = Chinese yuan. For both countries, this corresponds to PPP-adjusted US$ 0–
$220; SEK 9.6 = PPP-adjusted US$ 1, and CNY 3.4 = PPP-adjusted US$ 1.  
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In appendix A, we show the WTP question for the 30 percent reduction. The payment 
was expressed as a monthly cost for the household until 2050, and examples of the typical 
way households would pay  were listed, such as increased energy and gasoline prices.
6 
Moreover, we asked the respondents to assume that the costs of reducing CO2 emissions are 
shared among the countries according to their emissions today.
7
When the respondents chose their WTP value, both the monthly payment and the 
corresponding annual cost for the household were shown on the screen. The purpose of this 
was to ensure that the respondents clearly understood how much they said they were willing 
to pay.  
 
Section  3  of the survey was  a choice experiment  on  rules for allocating the 
responsibilities for CO2 reductions across countries and is not included in this paper. Finally, 
the fourth section asked questions about the respondent’s socioeconomic characteristics.  
1.1  The Oath Script  
The surveys with and without the oath were identical except for the inclusion of the 
oath script. In the treatment without the oath, the WTP questions followed the cheap talk 
script. Otherwise, the oath script was placed immediately before the WTP questions. Since 
we wanted the respondents to be aware of what they were taking the oath for, the survey 
introduced the oath by informing  the respondent that it would ask for  their household’s 
willingness to pay for CO2 emissions reductions.  
Both treatments included a shorter version of a standard cheap talk script. The script 
read as follows:  “Before making your choices, please consider how an increased cost would 
affect your possibilities of buying other things. Previous studies of this kind have shown that 
people claim to be willing to pay more money than they actually would in a real situation. 
Given this, it is important for you to answer these questions as truthfully as possible.”  
In our oath design, respondents were first asked, “Do you feel that you can promise us 
to answer as truthfully as possible the questions that follow?” The alternatives were 1) “Yes, I 
promise to answer the questions in the survey as truthfully as possible,” or 2) “No, I cannot 
                                                           
6 Wiser (2007) found that the WTP to support climate change policy depends on the payment vehicle used in the 
study. For example, with a collective payment mechanism, the elicited WTP is higher, compared to using 
voluntary payment mechanisms. In our study, we did not test for different payment vehicles, but rather made 
clear how the payments were made and kept this constant across countries. 
7 The text read:  “We will now ask you about your household’s willingness to pay for CO2 emissions reductions. 
Reducing emissions will be costly for households, mainly because of increased energy costs, such as higher 
electricity and gasoline prices. Your household and your descendants will have to pay a monthly cost until the 
year 2050. Moreover, the cost will be adjusted for inflation over time. Also, assume that the costs of reducing 
CO2 emissions are shared among the countries according to their emissions today.”  
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promise this.” From a practical viewpoint, such a commitment device is reminiscent of a 
common practice in Anglo-Saxon courts, where a witness is instructed to take an oath “to tell 
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.” However, asking the respondent to 
swear to tell the truth is not customary in Swedish or Chinese court systems. Respondents 
might also feel uncomfortable and regard it as strange to be forced to swear an oath in a 
survey. Therefore, we opted for a more neutral wording of the question, using “promise” 
instead of “swear.” 
The  essence  of  an  oath script is to increase the respondent’s commitment and 
attention to the survey, diminishing the propensity of light-hearted or “insincere” responses. 
Theoretical support can be found in the theory of commitment in social psychology (Kiesler, 
1971; Jacquemet et al. 2009; Joule and Beauvois, 1998). There is also evidence in economics 
research, suggesting that a promise can induce emotional commitments to fulfill the promise 
(Braver, 1995;  Ostrom  et al.  1992, Ellingsen and Johannesson 2004). Ellingsen and 
Johannesson (2004) proposed a model that includes preferences for keeping one’s word. In a 
recent study, Vanberg (2008) examined whether people keep their promises because they 
have preferences for keeping their word or because they dislike letting others down. His 
results suggest that people have preferences for promise keeping per se. Jacquemet et al. 
(2009) tested whether their results changed when the respondents were first asked to read a 
warning that lying might cause negative consequences for other people. They find that the 
results of the oath are independent of this warning and conclude that the oath works through 
the  intrinsic motives of a person to tell the truth. In our case, the respondents were 
anonymous survey participants, meaning that any effects  of the oath would  be through 
internal, not external, processes.  
An oath script might also be seen as a signal that the topic of the study is important 
and that one’s answers matter more than in a survey without an oath script. The oath could 
also be thought of as an emotionally charged version of the cheap talk script. We do not 
assume, however, that all people not telling the truth will admit it. What is crucial is that we 
emphasize that it is important to tell the truth, and thus the answer to the oath question is of 
secondary importance. In our study, most subjects chose to promise to tell the truth, so we 






                                                           
8 We also conducted an analysis that included the few respondents who answered no to the oath question, and 
our results remained robust. 
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1.2  Hypotheses on the Effect of an Oath Script 
What is the expected effect of an oath script in a payment card setting? One might 
expect that an oath would shift the whole WTP distribution to the left (including a rise in the 
number of zero bids), which leads to a lower valuation in general and a lower average WTP 
in particular.  This rests on the assumption that people  will  exaggerate their WTP in 
hypothetical situations, for example, due to warm-glow effects (Andreoni 1990) or moral 
satisfaction (Kahnemann and Knetsch 1992). However, an oath script could also affect the 
extent of strategic behavior (also known as strategic bias).  
Strategic bias arises when the respondent provides a biased answer in order to 
influence a particular outcome. This can be prominent in hypothetical surveys. For example, 
respondents in favor of a project may be tempted to overstate their WTP in an open-ended or 
payment-card question, assuming that a favorable decision depends on whether or not the 
survey produces a sufficiently large average value. At the same time, respondents whose 
expected cost of a scenario is larger than their WTP may be tempted to act strategically and 
state a zero WTP.  
In  any case, the oath script can make strategic responses less acceptable to  the 
respondent, and therefore result in a decrease in conditional WTP (i.e., WTP|WTP>0) and in 
the share of respondents stating zero WTP, leaving the effect on average WTP indeterminate, 
but the variance of WTP tighter. In addition, protest bids and insincere bids may also be 
affected by an oath. Because protest bids are usually thought to involve a zero bid, the oath 
script might result in fewer such bids. Insincere bidding, made less insincere by an oath, 
could result in either an increase or decrease in zero bids or WTP condition on WTP>0.  
Jacquemet et al. (2009) found in their experimental study that taking an oath 
decreased both the frequency of zero bids (interpreted as a decrease in opting-out behavior) 
and extreme bids that violate the earnings budget constraint set in the experiment; thus, they 
found a tighter variance for WTP. Because of opposing forces influencing zero bids and 
conditional WTP, we are agnostic about the expected direction of results, including the size 
of the WTP variance.  
The extent of hypothetical bias depends, as discussed in the introduction, on a number 
of factors. In particular, Ehmke et al. (2008) found that hypothetical bias could differ across 
different countries due to cultural differences. It is, of course, not clear that their results can 
be generalized, but their results suggest that the oath script could have different impacts on 
Chinese and Swedish respondents. 
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1.3  Administration of the Surveys 
The two surveys were conducted in November  and  December 2009. The 
questionnaire was carefully designed and tested on several focus groups and pilot studies. 
The survey was designed to be self-administered on the computer to eliminate interviewer 
bias and strategic answering to please the interviewer. In China, the survey was conducted on 
laptops in special rooms with invited respondents. In Sweden, the survey was taken online. 
The survey yielded 2,406 responses in Sweden (1,230 for the version without an oath script, 
and 1,176 for the version with an oath script), and 550 responses in China (277 for the 
version without an oath script, and 273 for the version with an oath script). The Chinese 
survey was administered in one city, Nanning, the capital of the autonomous Guangxi region 
in southwest China.
9
2. Characteristics of Respondents 
 Respondents were randomly selected to participate in the survey using a 
neighborhood-based sampling strategy that has been used in previous surveys (Krupnick et 
al., 2010). The respondents in the Swedish survey were reached using panel members of 
“Panel.se”,  Sweden’s  largest  survey panel with around 100,000 members. The panel 
members are recruited by telephone via  random digit dialing,  as well as through  online 
recruitment. Panel members between 18–74 years were randomly selected to participate in 
the survey. 
Descriptive statistics of the four samples are presented in table 1. Using a chi-square 
test (binary variables) and a t-test (remaining variables), we cannot reject the hypothesis of 
equal means/distributions for any of the socio-economic variables in Sweden,  except for 
university education. In China, the same is true for all socio-economic variables other than 
members of the Communist Party. Thus, the two samples in the two different treatments are 
generally comparable to each other. Also note that a large fraction of the respondents in the 
oath treatment group promised that they will answer the survey truthfully. In the Swedish 
sample, 98 percent made this promise, and 95 percent in the Chinese sample. This is in line 
with Jacquemet et al. (2009), in which only one respondent elected not to sign the oath in one 
of the experiments, corresponding to a refusal rate of just over 5 percent.  
 
                                                           
9 To develop a sample that was reasonably representative of the Nanning population, we randomly selected 277 
respondents to take the survey without oath script, and 273 respondents for the survey with the oath script. 
Although samples within any community should ideally be stratified for income and education, there is no 
public information database in Nanning that includes education, income, gender, and other important 
demographic characteristics. Therefore, we randomly chose  families through a population information network 
set up by the Nanning government. Specifically, the survey teams adopted a five-stage random sampling method 
to select respondents. (The primary sampling unit is the city district, the second sampling unit is the urban sub-
district, the third is the neighborhood committee, and the fourth is households, and fifth is the individual.)  
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Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics 
Variable (description) 

















Female (1 if female)    0.483    0.490    0.484    0.440  0.497 
Age (in years)    49.679  15.431  49.821  15.366  53.950  13.965  53.934  14.106 




1.868  0.677  1.845  0.632  3.256  1.350  3.223  1.200 









0.374    0.412    0.274    0.253   
Income    3.386  1.526  3.413  1.492  1.034  0.952  0.915  0.784 
Household active in 
religious organization 
(1 if active) 
 
0.064    0.065    0.025    0.011   
Left-wing party    0.315    0.305           
Green party    0.119    0.134           
Other party    0.154    0.150           
Center/right-wing 
party (ref. category) 
  0.413    0.411           
Communist            0.170    0.304   
No. in sample    1,230    1,176    277    273   
 
3. Willingness to Pay Results 
Based on the responses to the three payment-card questions,  we can calculate  a 
number of WTP measures. What we report in this paper is the WTP to reduce CO2 emissions 
zero–30 percent, 30–60 percent, and 60–85 percent. Respondent WTP is set to the midpoint 
of the interval,
10 except for those respondents who stated a WTP that was outside the range of 
the bid vector. For these respondents the WTP is set as the point values they gave in the 
open-ended payment question. In order to be able to compare the responses between the two 
countries, we report WTP in PPP-adjusted U.S.  dollars.
11
                                                           
10 There are many ways to interpret a choice on a payment screen. The midpoint approach may be the most 
neutral. Furthermore, since the WTP for 60% and 85% reductions depend on the choices made in the preceding 
question(s), there will be a large number of intervals, which means that it is simpler to treat the data as 
continuous. 
 Table 2 reports each country’s 
monthly WTP and the share of respondents with zero WTP for each reduction level, with and 
without the oath treatment. For the treatments with the oath script, we only included 
11 SEK 9.6 = 1 PPP-adjusted US$, and CNY 3.4 = 1 PPP-adjusted US$.  
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respondents who agreed to answer the questions as truthfully as possible.
12
Irrespective of the treatment group, a number of regularities are apparent in table 2. 
Swedes have substantially higher WTP for reducing CO2 emissions at all reduction levels, 
whether on a conditional or unconditional basis, implying, as can be seen in the table, that the 
share of respondents who are willing to pay nothing is much lower in Sweden. In addition, 
there is evidence in the Swedish sample for declining marginal utility as CO2 reductions get 
larger; there is less evidence for this effect in the Chinese sample.  
 In the appendix, 
we present the full distribution of responses for the various reduction levels and treatments. 
Turning to differences in the treatments, we had two opposing hypotheses about the 
effects of an oath on the share of respondents with zero  WTP.  We find some evidence 
supporting the hypothesis that the share of zero bids is lower for subjects taking an oath. 
Indeed, for every CO2 reduction level in both countries, except for the 85 percent reduction in 
China, the share of subjects stating a zero WTP is relatively  lower in the  oath script 
treatment. However, proportion  tests indicate that there are only significant differences 
between the shares of zero WTP for the 30 percent and 60 percent reduction in Sweden, and 
the 30 percent reduction in China.  
 
   
                                                           
12 There are some differences between the respondents who agreed to answer truthfully and those who did not. 
In both the Swedish and Chinese samples, there is a larger fraction of zero WTP responses and lower WTP 
responses for those who did not agree to answer truthfully, but no significant differences. Given the small 
sample sizes for those who did not agree to answer, the comparisons and tests are not very reliable.  
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Table 2.  Monthly WTP in PPP U.S. Dollars and Share of Subjects with Zero WTP 
                            SWEDEN 




CO2 reduction  
 
All 
Mean    
(std. err.) 
WTP>0  





Mean    
(std. err.) 
WTP>0  































                               CHINA 




CO2 reduction  
 
All  
Mean    
(std. err.) 
WTP>0  





Mean    
(std. err.) 
WTP>0  
































Ultimately, we estimate the effects of the oath script on the average WTP across the 
sample, which depends on the effect of the oath script on both the share bidding zero and the 
conditional WTP. We find that the conditional WTP decreases with the oath script in the 
Chinese sample, in which the treatment effect is significant for all reduction levels. In the 
Swedish sample, however, the conditional WTP is higher for the sample given the oath 
treatment, and we fail to reject the hypothesis that there is no significant difference for the 30 
percent reduction using a two-sided t-test. The need for future empirical efforts is evident to 
understand such patterns and whether they are dependent on the commodity or cultural 
context.  
Because we find that the oath  decreases  the share of zero-WTP responses  and 
conditional  WTP  in China, the effect on the average WTP  depends  on which effect is 
stronger and more pervasive. Our  results indicate that  the oath treatment results in a 
significantly lower average WTP  for the 30–60  percent  and 60–85  percent  reductions, 
suggesting that the effect in terms of lower conditional WTP is stronger there than on the 
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respondents with a zero WTP. In Sweden, the effect of the oath is the opposite, raising the 
average WTP, although this difference is only significant at the 30 percent level.  
We now turn to the issue of variance reduction, owing to fewer zero bids and very 
high bids. In line with the results of Jacquemet et al. (2009), we find support for the oath’s 
effect on variance reduction. This pattern is further supported when we take a closer look at 
the full distribution of WTP. The variance in WTP is consistently lower when an oath has 
been taken, even where the average WTP is higher in the oath treatment. Using an F-test, we 
can reject the hypothesis of equal variance between the two treatments for all reduction levels 
in the Chinese data, and for all but the first reduction level in the Swedish data. 
3.1  Econometric Analysis 
Because there are some differences in respondent characteristics between treatments, 
the next step is to estimate the effects of the oath treatment controlling for other variables. In 
addition, we will explore how the oath affects respondent groups with different demographic 
characteristics. 
The decision of whether or not to state a positive WTP is modeled with a binary 
probit model. The decision of how much to pay is modeled with a regression model with 
multiplicative heteroskedasticity using only the positive responses (WTP > 0). Both models 
are estimated for each level of reduction. We chose  this approach because of the small 




 The results of the probit models are presented in table 3.  
   
                                                           
13 Because WTP is censored at zero, these decisions can be analyzed together using a Tobit type 1 model, but 
this model is somewhat restrictive because it does not allow for the possibility that the two decisions could be 
fundamentally different. 
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Table 3. Explaining why people bid more than zero:  Marginal effects of the Probit Model  
  Sweden  China 
Variable  0–30%  30–60%  60–85%  0–30%  30–60%  60–85% 
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Communist 












































2382  2382  2382  536  536  536 
Pseudo R2  0.078  0.045  0.043  0.178  0.151  0.105 
 Notes:  Dependent variable = 1, if WTP is positive. Standard error is in parentheses. 
*,
 **,
 *** denote coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
The results of the probit models on the probability of stating a positive WTP confirms 
the results of the proportion and t-tests. Including an oath script increases the share of 
subjects stating a positive WTP. In the Swedish sample, the effect is significant for both the 
0–30  percent  reduction and the 30–60  percent  reduction, while for China the effect is 
significant for 0–30 percent reduction. 
The results of the regression models with conditional WTP as the dependent variable 
are reported in table 4. Note that these models only include respondents who stated a positive 
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WTP. Furthermore, we allowed  for multiplicative heteroskedasticity,  where 
. Thus, the model allows for different variances in the two treatments (see 
Harvey 1976 and Greene 2003).  
 
Table 4. Explaining conditional Willingness to Pay:  Marginal Effects Ordinary Least Squares 
Models  
  Sweden  China 
Variable  0–30%  30–60%  60–85%  0–30%  30–60%  60–85% 
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No. of observations  2192  2039  1742  388  312  260 
R2  0.084  0.048  0.029  0.357  0.168  0.152 
Notes:  The dependent variable = stated WTP. Standard error is in parentheses. 




 *** denote coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Again, the results in table 2 are confirmed by the regression models. In the Swedish 
sample, those who agreed to answer the survey truthfully have a considerably higher 
conditional WTP for the 0–30 percent reduction, and the difference is statistically significant. 
For the Chinese sample, the effect is the opposite:  the conditional WTP is significantly lower 
in the oath script treatment for all levels of reduction. Furthermore, the variance is 
consistently lower in the oath treatments for all reductions levels for China, and for two of the 
reduction levels for Sweden.  Moreover, taking an  oath seems to decrease the variance 
relatively more in the Chinese data than in the Swedish data. The decrease in variance is 
around 90 percent in the Chinese case, while the corresponding decrease in the Swedish data 
is only marginal, although statistically significant. 
Finally, we turn to the effect of the oath script treatment on unconditional WTP. This 
effect depends on the two effects we already have reported, the effect on the probability of 
stating a positive response,  P ;  and the effect on the conditional 
WTP, . The effect on unconditional WTP of a change in a dependent 
variable x is thus (cf. McDonald and Moffitt 1980): 
 
See the effect on the unconditional WTP of the oath script treatment in table 5. 
 
            Table 5.  Effect of Oath Script on Unconditional WTP 
Sweden  China 














Note : Standard error is in parentheses. 
*,
 **,
 *** denote coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 
In the Swedish sample, the group that received the oath script has a considerably 
higher unconditional WTP for the 0–30 percent reduction (i.e., Swedes are willing to pay 
$3.43 more for a 0–30 percent reduction in the treatment with the oath script, compared to the 
treatment without an oath), and the difference is statistically significant. In  the Chinese 
sample, the effect is the opposite. For all levels of reduction,  the  unconditional WTP  is 
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substantially lower in the oath script treatment, and the difference is significant for the 30–60 
percent and 60–85 percent reductions. 
3.2  Who Is Affected by the Oath Script? 
Thus far, we have shown that the oath script does affect behavior in both countries, 
albeit in different directions. However, it is also interesting to determine  if different 
respondent groups are more or less affected by the oath script. We investigate whether any 
differences are consistent across respondent groups and between the two cultural contexts. In 
order to examine the effect of the oath script, we estimate the same models as before, but 
include interaction terms between the oath treatment dummy variable and respondent 
characteristics; in other words, for each group of respondents,  we estimate two sets of 
parameters. One set represents the main effect, while the other represents the change due to 
the oath script. Because we still include the treatment dummy variable for the oath treatment, 
these interaction terms show whether a certain group of respondents is more or less affected 
by taking the oath, holding other respondent characteristics constant. The results for the 
probit model analyzing the likelihood to state a positive WTP are shown in table 6. 
Table 6.  Marginal Effects for Probit Models with Interaction Terms  
  Sweden  China 
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(0.006)  (0.007)  (0.010)  (0.037)  (0.039)  (0.039) 
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Communist party  
















































Pseudo R2  0.067  0.050  0.047  0.199  0.182  0.125 
No. of 
observations 
2227  2382  2382  534  534  534 
Dependent variable = 1, if WTP is positive. Standard error is in parentheses. 
*,
 **,
 *** denotes statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
‡ We dropped the interaction term between Green party voters and taking the oath from the 0%–30% regression. The 
reason is that all Green party supporters who took the oath had a positive WTP for the 30% reduction. 
 
For the Swedish sample, most of the interaction terms, with a few exceptions, are 
insignificant, indicating that the effect of the oath script is generally not dependent on 
respondent characteristics. An exception is that supporters of “other party” have the highest 
probability of stating zero WTP without the oath script, but with an oath script, they are 
actually more likely than right-wing voters to state a positive WTP. The political parties in 
this group are all small political parties in Sweden, usually formed in protest to the more 
established political parties. Common supporters of these parties are young males (Holmberg 
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and Weibull, 2009; Oscarsson and Holmberg, 2008; SOM-Institute 2009).
14 It is therefore 
possible, that supporters of these “other” parties are more likely to protest against the survey 
and state  a zero WTP.  This tendency seems to be reduced  when the oath is taken. 
Additionally, Green party voters are more likely to offer a positive WTP with an oath, even 
though they already have a greater tendency than all other political groups to do so without 
the oath.
15
In the Chinese sample, a number of the interaction terms with the oath and respondent 
characteristics  are significant. Older Chinese respondents are more likely than younger 
respondents to have a positive WTP. With an oath, however, this tendency is reduced. Those 
who earn more are more likely to have a positive WTP, and with an oath become even more 
prone to offering a positive bid. As in Sweden, the effect of an oath is not mediated or 
enhanced by age or income.  
 
In China, the respondent group that shows the largest effect of the oath are 
Communist party members. Without the oath treatment, the probability of having a positive 
WTP is 11, 32, and 26 percentage points higher for the 30, 60, and 85 percent reduction 
levels, respectively, if a respondent is a Communist party member. However, when both 
Communist party and non-Communist party groups are given the oath, at the 85 percent 
reduction level, Communist party members are actually less likely to state a positive WTP 
than non-Communist party members. Thus, being a party member increases the probability of 
paying something to reduce CO2, but this result disappears with the oath treatment. One can 
only speculate about why this result occurs. One explanation might be that the oath treatment 
reduces the propensity to be dishonest and preserve a self-image of being a Communist party 
member. 
Turning to the conditional WTP (see results in appendix B), taking the oath has a 
stronger impact on those who vote for “other small parties” in both the 30 and 60 percent 
reduction levels. In the treatment without the oath, their WTP is around $8–$9 lower than for 
right-wing voters, while those who took the oath have an almost $11 higher WTP than right-
wing voters. Thus, taking the oath both increases the probability of stating a positive WTP 
and the level of WTP for respondents who belong to these small political parties. The oath 
also has a clear and large effect on religious respondents in the Swedish sample. Willingness 
to pay increases by $14 per month for the 30 percent emissions reduction if the religious 
respondent takes the oath, compared to a non-religious person who took the oath. 
                                                           
14 The shares of male sympathizers are between 65% and 85%. 
15 This result is rather puzzling since we would have expected most of the Green party voters to have a positive 
WTP from the beginning. One explanation could be that some of them are protesting against the whole survey in 
the treatment without oath, for example, because they think that someone else should pay. 
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For  Chinese respondents with  higher incomes, the oath treatment reduces the 
conditional WTP, although this group is also more likely to state a positive WTP with the 
oath.  
In summary, because we find some clear differences on how the oath affects people in 
China and Sweden, we conclude that taking the oath has different impacts on different 
respondent groups in both countries.  Furthermore, people with some specific political 
preferences are highly affected by taking the oath in both China and Sweden. 
4. Conclusions 
The aim of our study was to implement and investigate the effects of an oath script in 
a stated preference survey. One advantage of testing this protocol in a survey—besides the 
fact that it is the natural environment for non-market valuation—is that our relatively larger 
sample size allowed us to identify groups of respondents that are more likely to change their 
behavior in the oath treatment. Another advantage of our study is that we are able to test these 
effects in two different cultural contexts, in China and in Sweden. A further advance in this 
study is our decision to separately analyze the probability of bidding zero versus a positive 
bid, and the conditional WTP, given that a positive bid was offered. This disaggregation of 
average WTP revealed quite interesting, if complex, patterns. 
We find a generally lower percentage of zero bidders with the oath than without it, but 
conditional WTP decreases with the oath in China and increases with the oath in Sweden, 
although not at all CO2 reduction levels. Overall, the oath significantly lowers average WTP 
in China with substantial magnitude at all reduction levels, and significantly raises WTP in 
Sweden at the 30 percent reduction level. In addition, the oath treatment produces lower 
variances in WTP, which is in line with the results found by Jacquemet et al. (2009) in a lab 
environment. While we find the results of lower variance of WTP on the oath treatment for 
hypothetical valuation questions encouraging, we are still  aware that challenges remain 
regarding how an  oath script can reduce hypothetical bias.  Hence, those hoping that 
administering an oath will unilaterally work to reduce WTP in all situations and partly answer 
critics of hypothetical bias in stated preference surveys will not find much comfort in our 
results.  
We cannot test why we observe such differences across these countries, but can offer 
some ideas. One reason may be that Swedes (but not Chinese) are more used to participating 
in surveys and being asked for their opinions, causing them react to the oath in different ways 
than the Chinese. It is also possible that the Chinese respondents took the oath script more 
seriously than their Swedish respondents due to cultural factors. More research is clearly 
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needed to investigate the effects of an oath in different cultural contexts and on taking an oath 
in different survey contexts, in other words, on issues other than global warming. 
Disaggregating the oath effects by respondent characteristics opens another window 
to understand these results. The largest effects are found for the Communist party members in 
China and for those who vote for smaller “alternative” political parties in Sweden. 
Communist party members are more likely to have a positive WTP than non-members in the 
survey version without the oath, but a large part of the positive effect of being a Communist 
party member disappears in the treatment with an oath script. In Sweden, taking the oath has 
a large effect on “other parties” voters. Without the oath script, this is the group with the 
highest probability of stating zero WTP; however, with an oath script, they become more 
likely to state a positive WTP than even right-wing party voters.  
References 
Aadland, D., and Caplan, A. J. (2003), Willingness to Pay for Curbside Recycling with 
Detection and Mitigation of Hypothetical Bias. American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 85: 492-502. 
———. (2006), Cheap Talk Revisited: New Evidence from CVM. Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization 60: 562-578. 
Alpizar, F., Carlsson, F. and Johansson-Stenman, O (2008), Does Context Matter More For 
Hypothetical than for Actual Contributions? Evidence from a Natural Field 
Experiment. Experimental Economics 11 (3): 299-314. 
Andreoni, J. (1990), Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm 
Glow Giving. Economic Journal 100: 464-477. 
Braver, S. (1995), Social Contracts and the Provision of Public Goods, in Social Dilemmas: 
Perspectives on Individuals and Groups, ed. by D. Schroeder. New York: Praeger, 
69–86.  
Carlsson, F. Frykblom, P. and Lagerkvist, C. J. (2005), Using Cheap-Talk as A Test of 
Validity in Choice Experiments. Economics Letters 89: 147-152. 
Carlsson, F., Kataria, M. Krupnick, A., Lampi, E., Löfgren, Å. Qin, P., Chung, S. and 
Sterner, T. (2010), Paying for Mitigation: A Multiple Country Study, Working Papers 
in Economics no 447, Gothenburg, Sweden:  Department of Economics, University of 
Gothenburg. 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 07622 
 
Champ, P. and R. Bishop (2001), Donation Payment Mechanisms and Contingent Valuation: 
An Empirical Study of Hypothetical Bias. Environmental and Resource Economics 19: 
383-402 
Champ, P., R. Bishop, T. Brown and D. McCollum (1997), Using Donation Mechanisms to 
Value Nonuse Benefits From Public Goods. Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management 33: 151-162. 
Cook, J., D. Whittington, D. Canh, F. R. Johnson and A. Nyamete (2007), Reliability of 
Stated Preferences for Cholera and Typhoid Vaccines with Time to Think in Hue 
Vietnam. Economic Inquiry 45: 100-114. 
Cummings, R., S. Elliot, G. Harrison and J Murphy (1997), Are Hypothetical Referenda 
Incentive Compatible. Journal of Political Economy 105: 609-621. 
Cummings, R., G. Harrison and E. Rutstrom (1995), Homegrown Values and Hypothetical 
Surveys: Is the Dichotomous Choice Approach Incentive Compatible. American 
Economic Review 85: 260-266. 
Cummings, R. G., and L. O. Taylor (1999), Unbiased Value Estimates for Environmental 
Goods: A Cheap Talk Design for the Contingent Valuation Method. American 
Economic Review, 89 (3): 649-665.  
Ehmke, M. D., Lusk J. L. and J. A. List (2008), Is Hypothetical Bias a Universal 
Phenomenon? A Multinational Investigation. Land Economics, vol. 84 (3): 489-500. 
Ellingsen, T., and M. Johannessson (2004), Promises, Threats and Fairness. The Economic 
Journal 114: 397–420. 
Frykblom, P. (1997), Hypothetical Question Modes and Real Willingness to Pay. Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management 34: 275-287. 
Greene, W (2003), Econometric Analysis, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey. 
Harvey, A (1976), Estimating Regression Models with Multiplicative Heteroskedasticity. 
Econometrica 44: 461-465. 
Holmberg, S. and L. Weibull (2009). 46, Svensk höst, [Swedish autumn].  SOM-report no. 
46,Gothenburg, Sweden:  SOM institute, University of Gothenburg (in Swedish). 
Jacquemet, N., R. V. Joule, Luchini, S., and J. F. Shogren (2009), Preference Elicitation 
under Oath. CES Working Paper, no. 43. Paris:  Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 
1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne. 
Jacquemet, N., A. Jameas, Luchini, S., and J. F. Shogren (2010), Referenda under Oath. 
Unpublished working paper, GREQAM-CNRS, Universités d'Aix-Marseille II et III 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 07623 
 
Joule, R., and J. Beauvois (1998), La soumission librement consentie. Presses Universitaires 
de France, Paris. 
Kahnemann, D. and J. Knetsch (1992), Valuing public goods: The Purchase of Moral 
Satisfaction. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 22: 57-70. 
Kiesler, C (1971), The Psychology of Commitment. Experiments Liking Behavior to Belief. 
Academic Press, New York. 
Krupnick, A., S. Hoffmann, and P. Qin. 2010. The Willingness to Pay for Mortality Risk 
Reductions in China. RFF Working Paper. Washington, DC: Resources for the 
Future. 
List, J. A (2001), Do Explicit Warnings Eliminate the Hypothetical Bias in Elicitation 
Procedures? Evidence from Field Auction Experiments. American Economic Review 
91: 1498–150. 
List, J., Berrens, R., Bohara, A and Kerkvilet, J (2004), Examining the Role of Social 
Isolation on Stated Preferences. American Economic Review 94 (3): 741-752. 
List, J. and C. Gallet (2001), What Experimental Protocol Influence Disparities between 
Actual and Hypothetical Stated Values? Environmental and Resource Economics 20: 
241-254. 
McDonald, J F. and R A. Moffitt (1980), The Uses of Tobit Analysis. Review of Economics 
and Statistics 62: 318–321. 
Murphy, J. G. Allen, T. Stevens and D. Weatherhead (2005) A Meta-analysis of Hypothetical 
Bias in Stated Preference Valuation. Environmental and Resource Economics 30: 
313-325. 
Oscarsson H. and S. Holmberg (2008), Regeringsskifte: Väljarna och valet 2006[Change of 
government:  The voters and the 2006 election]. Stockholm, Sweden:  Norstedts 
Juridik. In Swedish. 
Ostrom, E., J.Walker, and R. Gardner (1992), Covenants With and Without the Sword: Self-
Governance Is Possible. American Political Science Review, 86: 404–417.  
Vanberg, C. (2008), Why do people keep their promises? An experimental test of two 
explanations, Econometrica 76(6): 1467–1480. 
Whittington, D., V. K. Smith, A. Okorafor, A. Okore, J. L. Liu, and A. McPhail (1992), 
Giving Respondents Time to Think in Contingent Valuation Studies: A Developing 
Country Application. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 22: 
205–25. 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 07624 
 
Wiser, R. (2007), Using Contingent Valuation to Explore Willingness to Pay for Renewable 
Energy: A Comparison of Collective and Voluntary Payment Vehicles, Ecological 
Economics 62:419-432. 
 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 07625 
 
Appendixes 
Appendix A     Contingent Valuation Question:  30% Reduction 
Question 1:  How much would your household pay for the 30% reduction?  
 
Global emission reduction  No reduction  30% reduction 
Temperature increase  More than 4°F increase  4°F increase 
Amount your household is 
willing to pay per month until 
2050 
$0  $__?__ 
 
Click here to see the comparison table again.  
 
To fill in the blank above, select the amount that is the highest monthly amount your 
household would pay. 
 
$0  $1  $2  $3  $4  $5  $6  $7  $8 
$9  $10  $15  $20  $25  $30  $40  $50  $60 
$80  $100  $130  $170  $220  >$220        
 
You clicked on [X1] per month. This means that your household would be willing to pay [12 times 
X1] per year until the year 2050 to reduce emissions by 30 percent. 
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Appendix B 
Table B1.  Distribution of Responses for Chinese Sample 
 
Bid  0%–30%  30%–60%  60%–85% 
No oath  Oath  No oath  Oath  No oath  Oath 
0  30.69  24.32  44.77  38.61  49.82  53.28 
4  19.49  17.76  17.33  22.01  16.97  15.06 
7  1.44  9.65  2.17  10.04  3.25  10.04 
11  17.33  10.81  14.08  6.56  13  5.41 
15  5.42  11.97  3.97  10.81  3.25  8.11 
19  5.42  5.79  6.14  3.09  5.78  1.93 
22  1.08  5.02  1.08  5.41  0.36  2.32 
26  0.72  1.54  0.00  0.77  0  1.16 
30  6.86  6.95  5.05  2.32  1.81  1.93 
33  0.72  0.77  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
37  1.08  0.77  0.00  0.00  0.36  0.39 
45  4.33  1.54  1.44  0.00  1.81  0.00 
55  0.72  2.32  1.81  0.39  1.08  0.00 
75  3.61  0.77  0.72  0.00  1.08  0.00 
130  0.36  0.00  0.36  0.00  0.36  0.39 
165  0.00  0.00  0.36  0.00  0.00  0.00 
210  0.00  0.00  0.36  0.00  0.36  0.00 
270  0.72  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
350  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.36  0.00 
445  0.00  0.00  0.36  0.00  0.36  0.00 
 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 07627 
 
 Table B2.  Distribution of Responses for Swedish Sample 
Bid 
0%–30%  30%–60%  60%–85% 
No oath  Oath  No oath  Oath  No oath  Oath 
0  9.11  6.77  15.69  13.02  27.24  26.48 
10  5.77  4.77  6.5  6.34  8.29  6.34 
20  3.74  3.04  5.45  4.77  6.91  5.9 
30  2.11  1.91  3.9  2.08  2.76  3.13 
40  1.06  1.3  1.38  1.56  1.63  1.48 
50  12.03  9.81  14.07  15.36  13.33  13.98 
60  0.49  0.78  0.81  0.95  0.81  0.52 
70  0.73  0.35  1.06  1.22  0.41  1.04 
80  1.22  0.87  0.98  0.95  0.57  0.61 
90  0.41  0.09  0.57  0.35  0.24  0.17 
100  22.85  22.83  15.77  16.23  13.17  14.93 
125  0.89  1.3  2.03  2.43  1.79  1.82 
150  3.41  3.21  5.69  6.6  4.07  4.17 
200  14.15  16.75  8.86  9.03  6.26  6.16 
275  2.03  1.39  2.36  3.13  1.06  2.17 
350  4.07  6.6  3.74  3.39  2.76  2.08 
450  5.61  5.12  3.17  3.56  1.95  1.74 
575  3.01  2.43  2.11  2.34  1.71  2.00 
725  0.89  1.65  1.79  1.39  0.65  1.04 
950  2.52  4.08  1.06  1.56  1.54  1.39 
1200  2.52  2.95  1.3  1.74  1.06  1.13 
1550  0.08  0.35  0.81  0.78  0.57  0.61 
2000  1.06  1.39  0.49  0.95  0.73  0.95 
>2000  0.24  0.26  0.4  0.26  0.49  0.18 
 
   
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 07628 
 
Table B3. Marginal Effects Ordinary Least Squares Models with Interaction Terms  
  Sweden  China 
  0%–30%  30%–60%  60%–85%  0%–30%  30%–60%  60%–85% 
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Communist party  







Communist party × 










































































Pseudo R2  0.001  0.003  0.010  0.085  0.145  0.162 
No. of observations  2192  2039  1742  388  312  260 
The dependent variable = conditional WTP. Standard error is in parentheses. 
‡ We dropped the interaction term between religious person and the oath from the two last regressions because no religious 
persons who took the oath had a positive WTP for the 30%–60% and 60%–85% reduction in China. 
*,
 **,
 *** denote coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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